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A Monthly Column by EFAP Director John Yinger
September 2005
School Finance Reform and Property Values, 
Part 2:  Public Service Capitalization 
The main point of education finance reform is to improve student performance in disadvantaged school 
districts.  A successful school finance reform therefore makes disadvantaged school districts more 
attractive to homeowners and boosts the value of homes in those districts.  The link between school 
performance and property values is called public service capitalization.  This column discusses the 
evidence about public service capitalization and the implications of this phenomenon for the design of 
an education finance reform program. 
 
Most people who have searched for housing recognize that they will have to pay a premium to buy a 
house in one of the best school districts.  Nevertheless, public service capitalization is not an easy 
phenomenon to document because the role of school quality (or of other local public services) must be 
isolated from many other factors that affect house values.  Fortunately, however, this phenomenon has 
attracted the attention of many scholars and several high-quality studies demonstrate that, all else equal, 
the sales price of a house is higher in a school district where student performance is high than in a 
district where student performance is low. 
 
This evidence shows that households compete for entry into the most desirable school districts.  Because 
higher-income households will win this competition under most circumstances, the existence of public 
service capitalization implies that higher-income people will tend to live in better school districts than 
lower-income people.  This process is self-reinforcing, because a concentration of lower-income people 
means that a district has fewer resources and more disadvantaged students than other districts—both of 




As a result, public service capitalization helps to explain why education finance reform is often needed.  
The market process that allocates households to school districts leads to a situation in which children in 
low-income households systematically end up in lower-performing school districts than do children in 
higher-income households.  State policy, typically in the form of compensatory education aid, is 
therefore needed to ensure that all students have access to the type of education specified in a state’s 
constitution.   
 
The existence of public service capitalization also implies that education finance reform, or any other 
state policy that affects school performance, has unanticipated equity consequences.  To be specific, a 
compensatory education aid program results in capital gains for homeowners in the neediest districts and 
might lead to capital losses for homeowners in the least needy districts.  These gains and losses arise 
only for homeowners at the time the reform is announced.  The flip side of the capital gain for current 
owners in disadvantaged districts is that future owners in those districts will have to pay more for 
housing. 
  
Education finance reform also affects renters, but in a very different way, namely by raising rents in 
disadvantaged school districts.  Renters with school-age children experience an increase in school 
performance along with this rent increase, so that, on balance, they are not harmed by the reform.  Policy 
makers may nevertheless be concerned about the impact of rent increases on other households in these 
districts.   
 
To some degree, the gains and losses for current homeowners may be seen as compensation for the prior 
education finance policies that created the need for education finance reform.  After all, the values of 
houses in a school district are depressed when that district does not receive the state aid to which it is 
entitled according to the state’s constitution.  Reform-induced capital gains to long-term homeowners in 
this district therefore seem fair.  Nevertheless, gains and losses for recent homebuyers and the rent 
increases for childless household do not seem fair and should be acknowledged as part of the price of 
education finance reform. 
 
Some scholars have pointed out that, in principle, public service capitalization can result in an unusual 




receive more compensatory aid, which leads to an increase in their school performance and hence to an 
increase in their property values.  If this property value increase feeds back into the state aid formula, it 
may therefore undermine the intent of the compensatory aid program.  As it turns out, however, this type 
of feedback effect does not arise with a foundation aid formula, which is the type of formula used in 
most recent education finance reforms.  Although foundation aid does raise property values in the most 
disadvantaged districts, it does not raise these values enough to alter either the set of districts eligible for 
aid or the impact of the aid program on student performance. 
 
Overall, the main objective of recent education finance reform efforts around the country has been, as it 
should be, to improve the quality of the education provided to children in the most disadvantaged school 
districts.  Education finance reform also has complex impacts on households, however, as well as on 
children.  These impacts on households may include rent increases and capital gains for current 
homeowners in disadvantaged districts and capital losses for current homeowners in wealthy districts.  
Policy makers may want to consider these impacts when they decide how to pay for education finance 
reform.  
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